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Hungary: A Fortuitous Constellation Amidst and Beyond 
Democratic Transition 
 
 
Abstract. Hungary ratified Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances. This event is not a surprise since the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared 
capital punishment unconstitutional in 1990. Retrospectively, the development of the safe-
guards against capital punishment in Hungary might seem as a stretch of self-evident 
consequences. The present paper attempts to situate the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
its broader context and reflect upon the significance of symbolic founding gestures in times of 
democratic transition. 
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Introduction  
 
Hungary ratified Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms [hereinafter: European Convention] 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances on July 13, 
2003.1 Protocol No. 13 made the important move to remove the narrow exception 
for the application of capital punishment in times of war or imminent threat of 
war left open by Protocol No. 6 (Art. 2) two decades ago. A similar exception is 
also familiar from Art. 2 of the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter: ICCPR], aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty.2 Thus, Protocol No. 13 became the instrument 
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providing yet the most forceful demonstration of international commitment to 
doing away with capital punishment.  
 Hungary’s ratification of Protocol No. 13 is not a surprise. Decision No. 
23/1990 (X. 31.) AB of the Hungarian Constitutional Court abolished capital 
punishment over a decade ago, in the early days of the country’s democratic 
transition. In the case the Constitutional Court found that capital punishment 
imposes a limit on the essential content of the right to life and human dignity 
[Art. 54(1), Constitution], thus it is not compatible with Art. 8 (2) of the 
Hungarian Constitution precluding any limitation on the essential content of 
fundamental rights.3 The decision is one of the best known and most influential 
decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.4  
 Since 1990 there was no serious attempt to restore the death penalty in 
Hungary, the restoration of capital punishment is not an issue in mainstream 
public discourse.5  
 Hungary’s ratification of Protocol No. 13 provides an excellent opportunity 
to explore the interplay of strategic action and unexpected events surrounding 
the Constitutional Court’s decision at the dawn of the transition process, and to 
identify the permanent traces the Court’s decision left on democratic institutions 
and constitutional rights. A glance at the Constitutional Court’s decision in its 
broader context is hoped to contribute to understanding better the inner me-
chanics of abolitionist strategies for the benefit of future applications. Indeed, 
two important caveats shall be emphasized from among all lessons derived from 
the Hungarian success story. 
 Retrospectively, the development of the safeguards against capital punish-
ment might seem as a stretch of self-evident consequences. Shortly following 
the Constitutional Court’s decision,6 Hungary became a member of the Council 
of Europe and in two years, it ratified the European Convention for the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and its eight protocols, among them 
Protocol No. 6.7 

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 Marginal political forces did indeed resort to the rhetoric of reinstitution. Such 
attempts are going to be discussed in their broader context in detail. 
 
6
 Hungary became a member of the Council of Europe on November 6, 1990. 
 
7
 The ratification took place on November 5, 1992; promulgated in Act No. 31 of 1993. 
Subsequently, Hungary ratified Protocol No. 11 on April 26, 1995 (promulgated in Act No. 
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 Thereafter Hungary ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8 and finally, Protocol No. 13 to the 
European Convention. The decision of the Constitutional Court abolishing capital 
punishment in Hungary was formative of this safety net proscribing capital 
punishment. This is not to suggest, however, that the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court found the ultimate constitutional justification to keep capital punishment 
outside the array of state-imposed criminal sanctions. The Constitutional Court 
was not unanimous in its holding. Except for a lone dissenter, Hungarian consti-
tutional justices agreed about the outcome of the case [i.e. the unconstitutionality 
of capital punishment], while they still differed about the reasons supporting a 
decision on unconstitutionality and filed concurring opinions accordingly. Indeed, 
the Hungarian capital punishment decision is a good example of a situation 
that could be characterized as a “incompletely theorized agreement” in Cass 
Sunstein’s terminology.9  
 The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s decision provides an excellent 
opportunity to reflect upon the significance of symbolic founding gestures of 
times of transition the lasting effects of which permeate constitutional and 
democratic processes long after the fury and fever of transition has cooled. The 
present paper attempts to situate the decision of the Constitutional Court in its 
broader context, covering numerous domestic and international political, legal, 
judicial and intellectual influences and trends, which have delegitimized ‘death 
talk’ in post-communist Hungary. In matters of strong and diverging public 
sentiment, it is especially interesting to pay attention to the interplay of strategic 
moves and unexpected events reflecting on each other, thus creating strains of 
continuity essential for legitimizing stances taken by the agents and institutions 
of a new democracy. 
 
 
1. The immediate context of the Constitutional Court’s decision abolishing 
capital punishment 
 
Although in Hungary capital punishment as a criminal sanction was available 
until 1990, at the time of its abolition the application of the death penalty was 
                               
42 of 1998). Hungary also signed but has not ratified yet Protocol No. 12 concerning the 
prohibition of discrimination. 
 
8
 Ratified by Hungary on February 24, 1994, entered into force with respect to Hungary 
on May 24, 1994, promulgated by Act No. 2 of 1995. 
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 See Sunstein, C.: Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, New York–Oxford, 1998. 
35–62. 
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fairly limited. Capital punishment it was available for the most severe crimes and 
executions were not numerous. At the time it was abolished, capital punishment 
was an alternative sanction for genocide and certain war crimes, the most serious 
instances of homicide (murder, typically aggravated murder), terrorism, 
hijacking and for various military offences. The Criminal Code prescribed 
capital punishment altogether in 18 instances, out of which 11 constituted 
military offences.10 Death penalty was not a mandatory sanction: it was always 
an alternative to imprisonment. One of the standard casebooks on criminal law 
suggested in 1980 that in society with a stabile government capital punishment 
may become superfluous, as life imprisonment might be an adequate alternative 
to capital punishment.11 According to official records in the last 40 years, 
altogether 636 executions were performed, out of which 393 sentences were for 
political or military crimes. Between 1980 and 1989 altogether 29 persons were 
sentenced to death (there were 5 or less executions per year), and executions 
were not performed in all cases. At the time the population of the country was 
around 10 million and around 200 sentences were handed down for voluntary 
manslaughter.  
 These factors are not meant to trivialize the significance of the mere 
availability of capital punishment in a legal system. Still, it is important to see that 
prior to its abolition capital punishment was seen in Hungary as an extraordinary 
criminal sanction:12 capital punishment was applied in a limited number of 
cases, capital sentences were subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, subject to 
executive pardon. 
 
1.1  Capital punishment and the Roundtable Talks 
 
The immediate context of the abolition of capital punishment in Hungary was 
the period of democratic transition in 1988–1989. The transition process was 
significantly influenced by the strategy and actions of the Communist Party 

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 Capital punishment was provided for in the Criminal Code [Act No. 4 of 1978]. 
Persons who were below 20 at the time of committing the offence could not be executed 
[Art. 39(1) of the Criminal Code, while in force]; for military offences the age limit was 18 
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 The Criminal Code emphasized that capital punishment was an extraordinary measure 
[Art. 84, while in force]. 
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before and during the Roundtable Talks.13 Important safeguards were introduced 
to protect fundamental rights already in the early days of democratic transition. 
Although abolition of capital punishment was not at the forefront of the Talks, 
the issue of abolition was notably in the air. For instance, during the debates of 
constitutional revision in the still-communist parliament a former speaker of the 
communist legislature felt it necessary to note that he was for the abolition of 
capital punishment. As this episode clearly suggests that abolitionist voices were 
present in the discourse.  
 As surprising as it may sound, the Communist Party was not keen on 
preserving the death penalty. Indeed the last Communist minister of justice, 
Kálmán Kulcsár—entering office in June 1988—was an abolitionist. Recently 
he recalled that while criminal courts still handed down death sentences in June 
1988 and the last execution took place one day before he entered office, the 
Presidium of the Communist Party agreed to granting pardon to all offenders 
sentenced to death. This de facto moratorium lasted until the Constitutional 
Court abolished capital punishment in 1990. Nonetheless, while the Communist 
Party did not make efforts to preserve capital punishment, the Party did not 
propose the overall abolition of capital punishment during the Roundtable Talks 
either. 
 In the course of the roundtable negotiations the abolition of the death penalty 
received little attention from the opposition. Documents reveal that when 
drafting the new constitutional rules on fundamental rights, the Communist 
Party was willing to act on the proposals of the opposition.14 Instruments of 
human rights protection were often consulted by the participants of the Round-
table Talks and many provisions of the Hungarian Constitution concerning 
rights are translations of similar provisions of international instruments. The 
ICCPR was ratified by and promulgated in Hungary,15 at the time of the 
Roundtable Talks, however, Hungary did not belong in the Council of Europe. 
In addition to relying on instruments of human rights protection in the process 

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 For a concise overview of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks see András Sajó’s report 
in: Hungary in The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (ed.: Elster, J.).  
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996. The annotated documents of the Roundtable 
Talks were published in Hungarian in multiple volumes in: A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve, 
Kerekasztal-tárgyalások 1989-ben [The Script of Transition, Roundtable Talks in 1989]. 
Budapest, 1999. 
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 The written proposal of the opposition is not available. A rendszerváltás forgató-
könyve… op. cit., vol. 6, 107, note 63. The consent of the Communist Party is expressed in 
the minutes of the meeting of August 2, 1989. A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve… op. cit., vol. 
6, 101. 
 
15
 Law-decree No. 8 of 1976. 
72 RENÁTA UITZ 
  
of constitution making, outside the Talks there was a movement to raise human 
rights awareness and to direct attention to human rights instruments and 
‘rights talk’. For instance, the Alliance of Liberal Democrats (an opposition 
movement turned into a political party) organized a rally on the occasion of the 
200th anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of Man and 
Citizen of 1789. Such meetings certainly had the function of keeping the 
public aware and informed about developments at the Talks. 
 The draft of the Hungarian constitution’s rights chapter under preparation 
prohibited only the arbitrary deprivation of life and human dignity, and did not 
preclude deprivation of life per se.16 The text was proposed by the Communist 
Party. Indeed, the provision is a translation of Art. 6 (1) of the ICCPR. The 
opposition accepted the proposal of the Communist Party and the draft was 
adopted as Art. 54 (1) in the democratic constitution in identical terms. The 
minutes of the drafting negotiations do not contain references to the abolition of 
capital punishment.17 Despite the obvious limitations of its language, in the 
circumstances the fact that the proposed constitutional provision on the right to 
life and human dignity was a translation of an international instrument might 
have appeared as a sufficient safeguard of the right to life and dignity.  
 This is not to suggest, however, that the participants of the Roundtable 
Talks, the Communist Party and the representatives of the opposition alike, were 
unaware of the shadow of capital punishment. In 1988–1989, at the time when 
the opposition movements started to become more and more visible, most 
political activities directed against the hegemony of the Communist Party were 
illegal and the majority of them constituted a serious crime [typically treason, 
felony and alteration of the existing regime of governance (conspiracy, et al.)]. 
During the Talks, the Communist government moved to partially decriminalize 
acts that could affect the existing system of government. Although by the time 
the amendment entered into force, the Opposition Roundtable had been in 
session since March 1989 and the National Roundtable had already started on 
June 10, 1989.18  
 While capital punishment was abolished as a sanction for crimes against the 
state, under the existing rules of criminal law technically all participants of the 
Roundtable Talks and those who actively worked on behalf of the new 
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 For the text of the proposal of the Communist Party (draft of the Ministry of the 
Justice) see A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve… op. cit., vol. 6, 115–116, note 6.  
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 In the minutes of the meeting of the experts’ sub-committee [sub-committee I/1 
dealing with constitutional revision] there is no record of any discussion concerning the 
language of Art. 54 (1). 
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 Act No. 16 of 1989 as promulgated and entered into force on June 15, 1989. 
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opposition could have been prosecuted for ‘conspiracy’. Retrospectively it is 
possible to argue that participants of the Roundtable Talks most probably could 
not have been charged with the more serious degree of conspiracy (armed 
conspiracy or wartime conspiracy) that was subject to capital punishment before 
the amendment of the Criminal Code. Certainly, today’s wisdom was not so 
apparent in the summer of 1989, not even in the light of the Communist govern-
ment’s self-imposed moratorium on executions. Still, the Communist govern-
ment’s move to amend the Criminal Code was regarded as a sufficient safeguard 
against prosecution, at least at the initial stage of the Talks. Nonetheless, even 
after the Criminal Code’s amendment, participants of a conspiracy endangering 
the existing political, social or economic regime could be subject to 2–8 years 
of incarceration while organizers could have been incarcerated for 5–15 year 
(Art. 139 (1)–(2), Criminal Code). Arguably, activities like attending the Talks 
or assisting the Talks most probably would have sufficed for the application of 
these provisions. Therefore, it is not surprising that amending certain provision 
of the Criminal Code on crimes against the state was a major issue during the 
Roundtable Talks.  
 Indeed, participants of the Roundtable Talks—while drafting the funda-
mentals of a future, constitutional government—had to create a legal framework 
which guaranteed their personal security during the Roundtable Talks. Also, the 
constitutional and legal rules devised had to be such as to provide sufficient 
safeguards after the elections following the Talks, independent of the outcome 
of the first democratic elections. Experts’ sub-committees negotiated and drafted 
new rules applicable to elections, political parties; were developing amendments 
to provision on crimes against the state in the Criminal Code and had to create 
safeguards against aggressive political actions, and constitutional amendments 
necessary thereto. It was clear for all sides of the Talks that the amendment of 
the Criminal Code on crimes against the state necessitated a constitutional 
amendment. The committee of experts was focusing on crimes against the state 
and crimes restricting the freedom of speech.19 Apart from rules on specific 
crimes, procedural guarantees in criminal procedure were a major concern for 
the participants of the Talks.20 
 While crimes against the state were exempted from capital punishment due 
to the Talks, this development is best characterized as a side effect of the Round 
Table negotiations. Although the political forces did not prefer the retention of 
the death penalty, neither the Communist Party, nor the opposition forces moved 


 
19
 A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve… op. cit. [minutes of a meeting on August 24, 1989 
(Kutrucz, K.)], vol. 3, 375. 
 
20
 See e.g. ibid. (Hack, P., Kutrucz, K.)], vol. 3, 376, 386. 
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to abolish capital punishment altogether. The parties agreed that the new consti-
tution should contain a provision on the protection of the right to life (i.e. Art. 
54(1)). The wording of the provision as adopted is based on Art. 6(1) of the 
ICCPR, a respectable international human rights instrument, although it does not 
preclude capital punishment per se. Note, however, that the provision was 
drafted at a time when a de facto moratorium on executions was already in force. 
 
1.2 Beyond the Roundtable: strategic action and unintended consequences 
 
Despite all promising developments, in the course of the Roundtable Talks the 
participants did not move to abolish capital punishment altogether. At this time 
the issue of de iure abolition of capital punishment was addressed by a single-
issue pressure group formed predominantly by lawyers: the League Against 
Capital Punishment [Halálbüntetést Ellenzôk Ligája].21 In the beginning of 
1989, immediately after such political movements were legalized,22 the League 
Against Capital Punishment became very visible in mainstream press. News-
papers ran short notes on the first session of the League, published interviews 
and essays by the founders of the organization. These pieces presented a variety 
of arguments known from the international abolitionist discourse. It was also 
reported in the news that the League petitioned the Presidium of the Communist 
Party about the de iure abolition of the death penalty. The significance of the 
actions of the League Against Capital Punishment was also acknowledged on 
the international scene.23 In the meantime, papers also ran views from the 
retentionist side.  
 It is interesting to note that the League Against Capital Punishment placed 
the abolition of capital punishment in the context of the Hungarian liberal 
tradition. References were made to the works of 19th century legal academics 
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21
 Körösényi, A.: A magyar politikai rendszer [The Hungarian Political System (in 
Hungarian)]. Budapest, 1998. 181. Besides the League Against Capital Punishment a number 
of single-issue organizations appeared on the political scene in 1988–1989. For the problems 
of the formation and operation of political associations in Hungary before such political 
associations were expressly legalized at the beginning of 1989 see Halmai, G.: Az egyesülés 
szabadsága, Az egyesülési jog története [Freedom of Association, The History of the 
Freedom of Association]. Budapest, 1990.  
 
22
 That happened when the Communist Parliament passed Act No. 3 of 1989 on the 
freedom of association in early 1989. See also Elster, J.—Offe, C.—Press, U. K. et al.: 
Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies, Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 70. 
 
23
 See e.g. Amnesty International, AI-index: ACT 50/006/1997 at http://www.web. 
amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ACT500061997 [last visited on March 2, 2004]. 
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and politicians committed to liberal ideals (Ferenc Deák, Bertalan Szemere). For 
instance, in 1990 the League against Capital Punishment published, more 
precisely, reprinted Szemere’s essay, an elegant and brilliant exposition of 
abolitionist views originally written in 1839 for an essay competition organized 
by the Hungarian Society of Sciences. Szemere’s abolitionist essay won the 
competition and had a major influence on the understanding of criminal law and 
justice in the second half of the 19th century in Hungary. The draft criminal 
code of 1843 is an example of that development. Although the draft code was 
never enacted into law, it is noteworthy, that it did not contain capital punish-
ment among criminal sanctions.24 
 While the League Against Capital Punishment had a well-planned and 
straightforward abolitionist strategy, unforeseen and unintended developments 
had a major positive effect on the success of their case. In the public discourse 
the reconsideration of the 1956 revolution and the need to serve justice to the 
victims of 1956, primarily to Prime Minister Imre Nagy, became strongly 
associated with the abolitionist cause. The execution of Imre Nagy and his 
accomplices became the most exposed unjust execution of the Communist 
regime, giving thrust to arguments promoting the abolition of capital punish-
ment.  
 Without discussing the details and the vast literature of the subject, it is 
important to point out the relevance of the 1956 revolt and the execution of Imre 
Nagy from the perspective of democratic transition in Hungary. During the 
Communist era the events of 1956 revolt were usually characterized as a 
‘counter-revolution’. In the course of the Communist Party’s reform attempts, 
the Party moved to evaluate the past 30 years of its operation. It was in this 
context that Imre Pozsgay, the chairman of the sub-committee dealing with 
historical inquiry, stated in a talk on the radio on January 28, 1989 that “based 
upon recent research the events of 1956 constituted a popular revolt”. The 
position taken by Pozsgay—a high ranking Communist Party politician—clearly 
indicated a reversal in the Communist Party’s long-held position regarding the 
significance of the events of 1956. Reactions followed promptly. Independent 
political organizations were welcoming the Communist Party’s re-evaluation of 
the 1956 events in a memorandum.25 As it turned out later, the memorandum 
was signed by all major political organizations that later took part in the 
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 See the memorandum of February 18, 1989. A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve… op. cit., 
vol. 1, 50–51. 
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Roundtable Talks. Public discourse on the reconsideration of the events of 1956 
immediately started to flourish and continued all along the Talks.  
 The failed 1956 revolution was transformed into a symbol of democratic 
transition.26 In 1989, the essence of 1956 was represented by the execution of 
Imre Nagy and his accomplices. The rehabilitation of Prime Minister Imre Nagy 
evolved into a political issue of considerable significance. Over 200 000 people 
were present at the public funeral (reburial) of the unjustly executed. The funeral 
was one of the first instances when the Communist Party refrained from inter-
fering with the large-scale assembly in a public space organized by the opposition 
forces.27 Irreparable injustice committed by a branch of government in the name 
of law has never been more apparent than at the reburial ceremony.  
 Over the years the reburial of late Prime Minister Imre Nagy has been 
transformed into a ‘narrative’ shared by many political movements. It became a 
complex symbol of democratic transition in Hungary and as a symbol it helped 
establish continuity in public memory within Hungarian history via reposi-
tioning (re-emploting) the 1956 revolt. The formation of the new democratic 
government was announced on October 23, 1989, on the anniversary of the 1956 
revolution and October 23 also became one of the three major national holidays. 
Academic institutions were founded to investigate the events of 1956. Further-
more, as government agencies and civil organizations relied on the events of 1956 
in the course of demanding and designing restitution, it was also institutionalized 
in a more indirect sense. Numerous victim groups were formed and they 
became very visible in the media, their action and inaction was also attributed 
meaning.28  
 In the long run the discourse and re-evaluation of 1956 left its imprint on the 
fundamental structures of post-Communist politics in Hungary.29 While the 
League against Capital Punishment did not refer to the 1956 revolution and the 
executions, the reburial and the rehabilitation of the executed directed attention 
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26
 See e.g. Fletcher, G. P.: Searching for the Rule of Law in the Wake of Communism, 
Brigham Young Law Review, 1992. Vol. 1992, 146–150. 
 
27
 The reburial of Imre Nagy’s companions took place on June 16, 1989. On July 6 of 
1989 the Supreme Court acquitted the executed prime minister and his accomplices.  
 
28
 Körösényi: op. cit., 180. (Note that the scope of the restitution legislation covers 
crimes committed in the period of 1944–1990.) 
 
29
 Also see Éva Kovács finding that the ‘Imre Nagy narrative’ shifted over the years from 
being a victim narrative to a perpetrator narrative and was then inflated into an alibi to 
support political endeavors. According to Kovács this transformation (inflation) was fueled 
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rendszerváltó mítoszokról [Essay on the Myths of Transition]. Világosság, 2000. Vol. 41/6–
7, 28, 35. 
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on the cause of abolition of the death penalty. Although these developments 
were not calculated by the League, the re-evaluation of the events of 1956, and 
the reburial of Imre Nagy and his accomplices served as the strongest argument 
against retaining capital punishment. 
 In Hungary the impact of the 1956 revolution and Imre Nagy provided 
unexpected, yet, significant in fueling the abolitionist cause in the public 
discourse. History and reflection on history created a context that prompted 
political actors to remove capital punishment from the system of criminal 
justice and to prevent the restoration thereof in Germany as well.30 Memory of 
past injustice, however, does not command an evident case for abolition of 
capital punishment. In South Africa capital punishment was regarded my many 
as a symbol of terror and political oppression.31 Death penalty was applied 
disproportionately, primarily against black South Africans.32 Being mindful of 
this history of capital punishment one might have expected strong resistance 
against the death penalty. When the South African Constitutional Court 
abolished capital punishment under the interim constitution in R. v. 
Makwanyane, the terms of the final constitution were still in the making. 200 
000 petitions—one tenth of all petitions—requested the drafters of the final 
constitution to restore capital punishment. The amount of petitions is still 
shocking in itself as the restoration of capital punishment was the third item on 
the top-list—following the petition to preserve Afrikaans as an official 
language and keeping the parliament in Cape Town.33 The contrast between the 
Hungarian, German and South African experiences, therefore, is an important 
warning for movers of national abolitionist movements when it comes to tying 
the ropes of past injustice, memory, hopes and expectations into an applicable 
strategy. 
 
 

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30
 See Art. 104 of the Basic Law precluding capital punishment. 
 
31
 Bogie, D.: Life or Death? The Death Penalty in the United States and the New  
Republic of South Africa. Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law, 1996. Vol. 
3, 229, 230 and 233. 
 
32
 Bouckaert, P.: Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of Capital Punishment 
in South Africa. Stanford Journal of International Law, 1996. Vol. 32, 287, 313. 
 
33
 Gloppen, S.: South Africa, The Battle over the Constitution. Aldershot, Darthmouth-
Ashgate, 1997. 257. 
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2. The Constitutional Court’s decision abolishing capital punishment: the  
 essential content of the right to life and dignity 
 
The decision abolishing capital punishment is one of the first major judgments 
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.34 The challenge against the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment did not surprise the justices: the abolitionists 
made their case visible in the public discourse. Indeed, by the time the justices 
of the Constitutional Court entered office, the petition filed by the League 
Against Capital Punishment was already awaiting them.35 For the benefit of the 
Constitutional Court the League Against Capital Punishment  
“set forth in detail the European traditions of the movement against capital 
punishment, offered a survey of the state of capital punishment and its 
abolition, respectively, in the world, treated the history of capital punishment 
in Hungary, and discussed the reason for its abolition”.36 
 Although the procedure of the Constitutional Court is not constrained by 
deadlines, the constitutional justices decided the case within 9 months. 
 (a) The case reached the Constitutional Court in the period when the Court’s 
procedure was still under formation. Before deciding the case the Constitutional 
Court requested the expert opinion of various prominent lawyers.37 The law 
professors argued that capital punishment was cruel and unusual punishment and 
urged the Constitutional Court to abolish capital punishment on substantive 
grounds. It was also submitted that the availability of capital punishment has no 
effect on crime in society.38 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the 
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 An English translation of the decision is available in Sólyom, L.–Brunner, G.: 
Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy, The Hungarian Constitutional Court, Ann 
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 118–138. 
 
35
 With five justices, the Constitutional Court started its operation in January, 1990. The 
first judgment was handed down on February 12, 1990. The League Against Capital Punish-
ment submitted its petition on January 17, 1990 challenging the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. By the time the death penalty case was decided, the Constitutional Court had 9 
justices on the bench.  
 
36
 Horváth, T.: Abolition of Capital Punishment in Hungary. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 
1991. 153, 155. 
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 Since the early cases it has been the general practice of the Constitutional Court to 
request expert opinions from a wide variety experts, or to request the opinion of relevant 
government agencies. See Holló, A.: Az Alkotmánybíróság, Alkotmánybíráskodás Magyaror-
szágon [The Constitutional Court, Constitutional Review in Hungary]. Budapest, 1997. 98. 
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Attorney General appeared in a hearing in front of the Court. The Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court submitted that according to his moral and legal convictions 
the death penalty is unacceptable and it cannot be justified as a criminal 
sanction.39  
 While taking a clearly abolitionist position, the Attorney General also 
mentioned that the constitutional provision on the right to life and dignity (Art. 
54(1)) did not form a sufficient ground for deciding the case. The Attorney 
General argued that the Constitution’s right to life provision should be read in 
conjunction with the clause on permissible limitations on fundamental rights. 
The Attorney General also submitted that the most legitimate forum for taking a 
decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty would be the parliament, 
nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has sufficient legislative authorization to 
decide the case.40 
 (b) The Constitutional Court’s decision is very concise: following the 
assessment of the relevant constitutional provisions, the reasoning itself hardly 
exceeds two printed pages. Eight out of nine constitutional justices concurred in 
judgment, while one justice filed a dissenting opinion.41 The Constitutional 
Court read the constitutional provision on the right to life and dignity [Art. 
54(1)]42 in conjunction with the Constitution’s limitation clause which prohibits 
the tampering of the essential content of constitutional rights [Art. 8(2)].43 The 
Constitutional Court found that as the imposition of capital punishment allows 
for the total and irreparable extinguishing of the right to life and human dignity, 
capital punishment constitutes a limitation on the essential content of the right to 
life. Thereupon the Constitutional Court established that capital punishment was 
unconstitutional.44 The Constitutional Court thus abolished capital punishment 
upon general, substantive considerations. This way the Court did not review the 
procedural safeguards guiding the application of capital punishment, and the 
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 90. 
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 90. 
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 Dissenting opinions are authorized in Art. 26 of the Act on the Constitutional Court 
[Act No. 32 of 1989]. The dissent shall be filed with written reasons. Justices may also 
submit concurring opinions to the judgment as a matter of Court practice. The capital 
punishment case was the first decision in which the justices filed concurring opinions. 
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 Art. 54(1) of the Constitution provides that “in the Republic of Hungary everyone has 
the right to life and dignity, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of”.  
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 Art. 8(2) of the Constitution provides that “in the Republic of Hungary fundamental 
rights and obligations shall be regulated in act of parliament, the essential content of 
fundamental rights may not be limited”. 
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 92. 
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Court also refrained from analyzing the details of the practice of death 
sentencing. 
 (c) The aspect of the judgment which subjected the reasoning followed by 
the Constitutional Court to criticism was indicated by the Constitutional Court’s 
reasoning.45 The justices pointed to that the tension between the Constitution’s 
provision on the right to life and dignity [Art. 54(1)] on the one hand, and the 
general limitation clause [Art. 8(2)] on the other. The majority opinion makes it 
clear that while the Court relied on its interpretation in abolishing the death 
penalty, it was the duty of the parliament (in its capacity of a constitution-
maker) to resolve the tension within the constitutional text.46  
 In his dissent Justice Schmidt argued that it was ultra vires of the Constitu-
tional Court to resolve this tension via interpretation, since an interpretation of 
this kind amounts to constitution-making. Dissenting Justice Schmidt, did not 
question the legitimacy of judicial review as a means of deciding about the 
abolition of capital punishment. The dissent is based on the argument that it is 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to resolve a contradiction 
within the text of the constitution. According to the dissent, the most the 
Constitutional Court could do when facing such a textual deficiency is calling 
the attention of the constitution maker (parliament in the Hungarian case) to the 
problem. According to the dissent, lack of jurisdiction would however not 
preclude the Court from disclosing its arguments against capital punishment.47 
Justice Schmidt unfortunately did not elaborate on the possible implications of 
this position. In this context it is important to note that although the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has a power to hand down advisory opinions in cases of 
abstract constitutional interpretation, following the decision abolishing capital 
punishment the Court has construed this jurisdiction narrowly.48  
 (d) The tension generated by the relevant constitutional provisions is easy to 
trace.49 Art. 54(1) on the right to life clearly allows for instances of non-arbitrary 
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93. Note that this finding is in the reasoning 
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93.  
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 94–95. 
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 Arts. 1(g) and 21(6) of the Act on the Constitutional Court. See 31/1990 (XII. 18.) AB 
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deprivation of life. The limitation clause [Art. 8(2)] at the same time precludes 
any limitation on the essential content of constitutional rights. In the case the 
Court found that any deprivation of life is arbitrary per se.  
 János Kis argues convincingly that the construction chosen by the Court 
violates basic rules of constitutional construction and in essence alters the text of 
the constitution.50 Furthermore, according to Kis the Court could have relied on 
the narrow reading of both the right to life provision and the limitation clause.51 
Although this solution would have eliminated the tension within the consti-
tutional text, it does not resolve the issue of constitutionality of capital punish-
ment. More precisely, it does not offer a general, substantive resolution. Instead, 
it would have directed the Constitutional Court to test the arbitrariness of the 
rules of procedure and the practical application thereof. As another viable 
alternative Kis submits that the justices could have argued that the Court’s 
perception of the right to life as an inviolable, absolute right is based on 
generally accepted moral grounds. This solution would have accounted for yet 
another problematic premise of the decision. As Kis notes concerning the nature 
of deprivation of the right to life, it is important to see that all intentional acts 
resulting in the deprivation of life are ‘total and irreparable’ in the sense used by 
the Constitutional Court.52 
 (e) The Constitutional Court’s reasoning did not enter into an analysis of 
moral considerations and shared beliefs about capital punishment in this manner. 
However, Chief Justice Sólyom’s concurring opinion is a helpful guide in 
understanding how the Constitutional Court reached its interpretation of 
conflicting constitutional provisions. The introductory part of the Chief Justice’s 
concurring reasons is entitled “The Liberty of the Constitutional Court in 
Concluding its Judgment”.53 The Chief Justice argued that the Constitutional 
Court shall develop its own interpretation of the right to life and human dignity. 
This interpretation should be part of a coherent jurisprudence, a jurisprudence 
that is beyond the reach of daily politics, transcending the written constitution. 
This ‘invisible constitution’ shall be the standard of constitutionality applied by 
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 Kis: loc. cit., 57. The Court equates ‘arbitrary deprivation’ with ‘deprivation’ of life. 
The concurring opinions dealt with the meaning of arbitrariness in detail. See the concurring 
opinion of Justices Lábady and Tersztyánszky at 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 
96 and Chief Justice Sólyom at  23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 107. 
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 Kis: op. cit., 58. 
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 Kis: op. cit., 56. 
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 96. Chief Justice Sólyom’s concurring 
opinion also appeared as a separate article as Sólyom, L.: A halálbüntetés ellen [Against 
Capital Punishment]. Világosság, 1990/12, 908–915. 
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the Court. In creating the invisible constitution the Constitutional Court is 
constrained only by the requirements of constitutionalism.54  
 The concept of the invisible constitution immediately became subject to 
criticism.55 Although the concept is one of the most-known jurisprudential 
premises developed by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in its practice the 
Constitutional Court did not rely on this technique of interpretation extensively.56 
Nonetheless, the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion explains at least in part the 
Court’s perception of its own role and its attitude towards the inconsistency 
faced in the abolition case. 
 
 
3. The aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s decision 
 
The above analysis focused on the central argument of the abolition decision: on 
the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the right to life and dignity. The 
Court decided about the unconstitutionality of capital punishment in abstract 
terms and the relevant part of the reasoning is concise. Although the essence of 
the decision may be summarized very briefly, numerous additional points were 
made in the reasoning of the Court and in the concurring opinions. Most of these 
issues are relative to the broader context of the abolition of capital punishment 
and will be analyzed in the context of future developments.  
 To begin with, the Constitutional Court’s decision abolishing capital punish-
ment was formative of constitutional jurisprudence: the lasting effects of the 
Court’s reasoning have become traceable in constitutional decisions ever since. 
Thus, the capital punishment decision—initially a benchmark of the success of 
democratic transition—slowly permeated constitutional jurisprudence thus 
triggering effects that last well past the early days of democratic institution 
building.  

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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 97–98. 
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 In the literature the concept of the invisible constitution was associated with sheer 
reliance on natural law. For a comparative analysis of the concept of the invisible constitu—
tion as a technique of interpretation see e.g. Trang, D. V.: Beyond the Historical Justice 
Debate, The Incorporation of International Law and the Impact on Constitutional Structures 
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 According to Kis it is possible to show that the Constitutional Court gave up on a 
natural law based theory in 1992 in the course of reviewing restitution legislation. Kis: op. 
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activism. 
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 Furthermore, note that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and 
binding, they have an erga omnes effect.57 All provisions regulating capital 
punishment and listed in the Constitutional Court’s decision were omitted from 
the books accordingly. In this sense, the judgment of the Court was self-
executing.58 The Constitutional Court’s decision, however, took the cooperation 
of the other branches while also supplying them with useful perspectives in a 
number of respects. To being with, the decision pointed to an inconsistency 
within the text of the Constitution, a matter awaiting resolution that might also 
require constitutional amendment. Second, with removing capital punishment 
from among criminal sanction, the Constitutional Court added new points of 
consideration for the coming reform of the Criminal Code. The Court’s decision 
provided a set of principled underpinnings for governmental responses to a wave 
of violent crimes, an undesirable phenomenon to be dealt with in a newly 
emerging democracy. Outside the immediate context of criminal law and 
criminal policy making the Constitutional Court’s decision also contributed to 
Hungary’s entry into international organizations and undertaking international 
obligations that are conditioned upon a domestic observance of the dictates of 
the rule of law and respect for human rights.  
 It is not to suggest that the Constitutional Court’s decision set the course of 
events as a grand plan of action. Although some of the steps to be undertaken in 
pursuance of the Constitutional Court’s decision were more or less foreseeable, 
the Court did not prescribe a strategy to be carried into execution by the political 
branches. Rather, the Constitutional Court’s decision permeated the open 
discussion of public affairs and supplied the participants of the public discourse 
both with a framework of argument and a set of premises, infusing the ongoing 
exchange of ideas with a rhetoric of constitutionalism and rights talk. Participants 
of the discourse were free to rely on these premises and often responded to each 
other’s moves using the Court’s decision as a yardstick. The Constitutional 
Court’s decision and international engagements undertaken by Hungary in its 
aftermath were used routinely and efficiently to undermine (otherwise marginal) 
attempts to restore capital punishment. These developments were crucial for 
democratic institution building and have been instrumental ever since as they 
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 Art. 27 of the Act on the Constitutional Court. 
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 In the course of the restitution process Act No. 17 of 1993 extended the scope of 
crimes exempt from the statute of limitations. Among the newly included crimes there were 
crimes which were already barred before 1993 and were subject to capital punishment. Act 
No. 17 of 1993 however abolished capital punishment for these crimes [Arts. 81–82]. 
Affirmed by the Constitutional Court in dictum in 2/1994 (I. 4.) AB decision, ABH 1994. 49. 
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clearly demonstrate the force of safeguards in curbing attempts to limit rights in 
the name of unsubstantiated fears and public sentiment. 
 Due to the multiplicity of issues, it would be impossible to provide a detailed 
analysis of all potential aspects and consequences of the capital punishment 
decision. Instead, the following part attempts to draw a sketch of the develop-
ment that arose upon and in response to the Constitutional Court’s decision 
abolishing capital punishment.  
 
3.1  Tension within the text of the Constitution 
 
In the capital punishment decision, the Constitutional Court pointed to a textual 
inconsistency within the Constitution itself. In addition, the Court noted that it 
was the duty of the legislative to resolve this tension. Although since 1990 
numerous constitutional amendments were passed, the Constitution’s Art. 54(1) 
on the right to life and dignity allowing for a non-arbitrary deprivation of life 
has not been amended.59 Thus, the inconsistency of the constitutional text 
persists. This fact, however, should not be interpreted as a sign of the parlia-
ment’s hesitance to commit to the abolition of capital punishment. From the 
perspective of the abolition of capital punishment the relevance of this tension, 
or the non-conclusive constitutional language has been minimized in 1993, when 
Hungary became a member of the Council of Europe, ratified the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocol No. 6 and was practically 
eliminated with the ratification of Protocol No. 13. As for the elimination of the 
tension that has been lingering around the text of the constitution ever since Art. 
54(1) was formulated, the bold spirits hope for more compelling language to 
appear in the new constitution to be adopted, the latest. 
 
3.2  The relevance of the decision in jurisprudence building: references to 
  international trends and the multi-layered understanding of human dignity  
 
The decision of the Constitutional Court in the capital punishment case became 
formative for a number of techniques of constitutional reasoning and juris-
prudential concepts over the years. From the very start of its operation, the 
Constitutional Court consciously undertook a project of jurisprudence building. 
The decision abolishing capital punishment is a clear example of this endeavor, 
the traces of which are easy to identify in the Court’s reasoning. On the one 
hand, in underscoring their conclusion the justices relied on sources of inter-
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 Pursuant to Art. 24(3) of the Hungarian Constitution, Parliament may amend the 
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national human rights law. This methodological move was crucial in legitimizing 
the outcome reached in the case. As for the substantive aspect of the decision, in 
the case the Court continued to build the foundations of a constitutional juris-
prudence heavily informed by the protection of human dignity. As more recent 
decisions suggest, while the protection of human dignity is still of significance 
in Hungarian Constitutional jurisprudence, the Court’s approach to human dignity 
has not been without uncertainties. 
 
(International instruments of human rights protection.) At the time of the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in the capital punishment case the ICCPR was 
the only major international instrument of human rights protection was that was 
ratified and promulgated in Hungary. As was mentioned before, the provision in 
the Hungarian Constitution protecting the right to life and human dignity against 
arbitrary deprivation (Art. 54(1)) follows the language of the ICCPR’s Art. 6(1). 
Note, however, that in the capital punishment decision in addition to various 
provisions of the ICCPR the Constitutional Court did refer to European instru-
ments of human rights protection which Hungary did not ratify at the time. Sure, 
membership in the Council of Europe was literally days away, but it took almost 
an additional two years to ratify the European Convention itself. Therefore, it is 
interesting to investigate the reasons behind the Constitutional Court’s reference 
to such international instruments of human rights protection. 
 The Constitutional Court’s reliance on the European Convention and Protocol 
No. 6 at the time cannot be explained with mounting international pressure. It 
was only in 1994 that the Council Europe made imposing a moratorium on 
executions a condition of accession for aspiring members, the moratorium being 
the first step on the road to abolition.60 Expectations were nowhere near what for 
instance Russia is exposed with regard to adopting Protocol No. 6,61 and it was 
years before abolition of capital punishment could have been presented as a 
silent precondition of EU accession, as was the case with regard to the Baltic 
republics.62 Thus, lacking international pressure the Court’s references to 
international instruments are even more curious. 
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 See Resolution 1044 (1994) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council  of Europe. 
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 For an insightful analysis on the relationship of Russia and the Council of Europe in 
the context of the death penalty see Ritter, K. H.: The Russian Death Penalty Dilemma: 
Square Pegs and Round Holes. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 2000. 
Vol. 32, 129. 
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 Capital punishment was abolished by legislative action in Estonia (1998) and Latvia 
(1999). In Lithuania capital punishment was abolished by the Constitutional Court (ruling of 
December 9, 1998).  
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 Note that the Constitutional Court did not apply these international 
instruments to the issue before the Court. Rather, the justices referred to these 
instruments as indicators of an international trend towards the abolition of 
capital punishment.63 This finding might be a strong hint towards abandoning 
the view that the Court used these international human rights instruments as 
mere decorations. One has to keep in mind that the Constitutional Court was 
struggling with a prima facie tension between relevant constitutional provisions 
in one of its first major decisions.  
 Whether it is permissible for a constitutional review forum to resolve a 
tension between relevant constitutional provisions is a question that runs to the 
core of any theory on constitutional adjudication. Interestingly, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court is not the only constitutional review forum that took a 
rather pragmatic approach avoiding such theoretical problems. In a recent case 
the South African Constitutional Court was of the opinion that  
“… A court must endeavor to give effect to all the provisions of the 
Constitution. It would be extraordinary to conclude that a provision of the 
Constitution cannot be enforced because of an irreconcilable tension with 
another provision. When there is tension, the courts must do their best to 
harmonize the relevant provisions, and give effect to all of them. …”64 
 In the capital punishment case the Hungarian Constitutional Court harmonized 
this tension in part via resorting to international human rights instruments. This 
solution might be seen as an example of the justices’ aspiration to build a 
coherent jurisprudence, in conformity with foreign and international law and 
jurisprudence. The Hungarian Constitutional Court is certainly not the only 
“new” constitutional court to rely extensively on comparative analysis. In South 
Africa the drafters of the interim and then the final constitution regarded foreign 
and international examples as a source of guidance and external constraint on 
the interpretation of the constitution.65 The jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court is often informed by careful comparative analysis. 
 In Hungary, in the constitutional jurisprudence of an emerging post-
communist constitutional democracy, international standards became important 
on the domestic scene as they provide an external reference point which is hard 
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 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93. 
 
64
 United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic of South Africa and others, 
(CCT23/02) 2003 (1) SA 495; 2002 (11) BCLR 1179; [2002] ZACC 21 (4 October 2002), 
para 83. 
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 See Art. 35(1) of the interim Constitution, and Art. 39 of the final Constitution. Webb, 
H.: The Constitutional Court of South Africa. University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 1998. Vol. 1, 205, 208. 
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to question for those who intend to stay in mainstream public discourse.66 As 
Chief Justice Sólyom explained:  
“The adoption of constitutional notions and doctrines has not only provided 
a legitimate basis for the Constitutional Court but it has also compelled the 
challengers of a decision to enter into an internationally endorsed discourse 
with internationally impartial definitions.”67  
 In its jurisprudence the Hungarian Constitutional Court have ever since 
consulted foreign and international sources at some length, even in cases where 
the justices decided not to make explicit mention of the foreign example. Since 
the ratification of the European Convention the Constitutional Court routinely 
reviews the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and also pays 
attention to leading cases from established democracies. A detailed analysis of 
cases in which the Hungarian Constitutional Court consulted foreign or 
international jurisprudence, and the implications thereof, would far exceed the 
limits of the present analysis. The approach followed by the Constitutional Court 
in the capital punishment case nonetheless remains an important example of a 
conscious judicial effort of jurisprudence building in a democratic transition. 
As the Hungarian example shows, international human rights instruments can 
provide sound grounds for such an exercise even in such cases where inter-
national conventions cannot but stand as evidence on emerging international 
trends in the field of human rights.  
 
(Human dignity in Hungarian constitutional jurisprudence.) Reliance on inter-
national human rights instruments was not the only means of early jurisprudence 
building applied by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in the capital punish-
ment decision. It was also in this case that the Constitutional Court established 
an important pillar of its jurisprudence on human dignity. Over the years the 
Constitutional Court established a 3-level system for the protection of 
constitutional rights which was followed by the Court until the late 1990’s. 
Interestingly, in its initial form all three levels of rights protection were 
connected with an aspect of the right to human dignity. A gradual erosion of this 
tripartite system, an important cornerstone of which was laid down in the capital 
punishment case can be sensed in more recent decisions on homosexual 
sodomy68 or physician assisted suicide.69 
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adjudication see Trang, op. cit., 1. 
 
67
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 In its jurisprudence the Constitutional Court distinguished three types of 
constitutional rights from the perspective of constitutionally permissible 
limitations (standards of review). In a sense the concept introduces a hierarchy 
of constitutional rights.70 On top of the imaginary hierarchy is the right to 
human life in indivisible unity with human dignity [Art. 54 (1), Constitution] 
that cannot be limited or restricted.71 This is how the Constitutional Court 
constructed the unity of right to life and dignity in the capital punishment case. 
And it was on this ground where the Constitutional Court held that capital 
punishment amounts to the total and irreparable annihilation of the right to life 
and human dignity.  
 Note that the Hungarian Constitutional Court is not the sole constitutional 
review forum of the view that the constitutionality of capital punishment should 
be seen as a deprivation of human dignity. Justice Cory of the Canadian Supreme 
Court argued in Kindler v. Canada that  
“[t]he death penalty not only deprives the prisoner of all vestiges of human 
dignity, it is the ultimate desecration of the individual as a human being. It is 
the annihilation of the very essence of human dignity.”72  
 Also, the justices of the South African Constitutional Court found in 
Makwanyane that capital punishment violated the constitutional right to human 
dignity.73 Such a view is not unprecedented even in the U.S. where Justice 
Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court famously said in his concurring opinion in 
Furman that  
“Although pragmatic arguments for and against the punishment have been 
frequently advanced, this longstanding and heated controversy cannot be 
explained solely as the result of differences over the practical wisdom of a 
particular government policy. At bottom, the battle has been waged on moral 
grounds. The country has debated whether a society for which the dignity 
of the individual is the supreme value can, without a fundamental 
inconsistency, follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members 
to death.”74 (emphasis added) 
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 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Justice Brennan, concurring) In 4 
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 In these cases, justices formulated their objections against capital punish-
ment in the context of human dignity. The most important difference between 
these positions and the understanding followed by the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court is that unlike the other justices, the Hungarian justices understood the 
human dignity in unity with the right to life to be absolute and not allowing for 
any constitutionally acceptable limitation. In essence, the position developed by 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court is echoes the words of Art. 1(1) of the 
German Basic Law declaring human dignity as inviolable. The major difference 
between the Hungarian and the German approach is that while the inviolability 
of human dignity is stated clearly in the German Basic Law, in Hungary Art. 
54(1) of the Constitution proscribes only arbitrary deprivations of the right to 
life and human dignity: the principle of inviolability of human dignity was 
established by the Constitutional Court.  
 Except for the right to human dignity read in conjunction with the right to 
life, constitutional rights are subject to limitations in accordance with Art. 8(2) 
of the Constitution. Under the limitation clause the Court first reviews whether 
the challenged norm infringes the essential content of the right. If the limitation 
does not touch the essential content of the right in question, the Constitutional 
Court determines the constitutionality of the limitations by the so-called ‘necessity-
proportionality’ test. This approach is essentially similar to proportionality 
analysis widely applied by such courts as the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, the Canadian Supreme Court (Oakes test), the European Court of Human 
Rights or the European Court of Justice.  
 In Hungarian jurisprudence the proportionality test applies not only to consti-
tutional rights mentioned expressly in the text of the Constitution, but also to 
constitutional rights that were derived from the so-called ‘comprehensive 
(general) personality right’ (a ‘mother right’) recognized by the Constitutional 
Court. The Constitutional Court derived the ‘comprehensive (general) personality 
right’ from the right to human dignity before the capital punishment decision.75 
The comprehensive personality right was derived from the right to human 
dignity read in conjunction with the right to life and was construed by the 
Court to protect the persons’ decisional autonomy or self-determination. The 
comprehensive personality right has a subsidiary character: it may be invoked to 
                               
(1976), the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital 
punishment. 
 
75
 8/1990 (IV. 23.) AB decision. At the time of the decision of this case, the petition for 
the abolition of the death penalty was already filed with the Court. 
90 RENÁTA UITZ 
  
protect personal autonomy if there is no specific right enumerated in the 
constitution.76  
 Although in the capital punishment decision the Constitutional Court did not 
mention the comprehensive personality right, in its jurisprudence of the Court 
applied a concept of human life and dignity which includes elements from the 
understanding of human life and dignity developed therein.77 The Constitutional 
Court relied on the broader concept of right to life and dignity also known as 
‘comprehensive personality right’ and ‘right to personal autonomy’ in a wide 
range of cases including the right to retain control over motions in civil cases,78 
to the right to privacy79 or the right to establish fatherhood in a civil case.80 
The Court also used the concept to establish its jurisprudence regarding 
religious freedom81 or freedom of speech.82 One may find that the Constitutional 
Court used the concept of right to life and dignity to widen the scope of rights 
protection via defining and redefining constitutional rights. 
 Rights not belonging to the above mentioned categories may be limited at 
the wide discretion of the legislative. Limits imposed may not be arbitrary and 
shall treat persons as subjects with equal dignity [Arts. 54(1) and 70/A (1), 
Constitution)].83 This standard is lower than the proportionality review applied 
under the limitation clause, essentially it calls for simple reasonableness review. 
The standard of treatment of persons as subjects with equal dignity is typically 
applied in cases where the law draws a distinction on a ground that is not 
mentioned expressly in the Constitution’s non-discrimination clause [70/A(1), 
Constitution] or where discrimination was not made with regard to a consti-
tutional right.  
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 The interplay between dignity as a constitutional right and equal dignity as a 
constitutional standard is best demonstrated by the Constitutional Court’s 
approach towards restitution. The Court ruled in one of its first decision on the 
constitutionality of restitution, that restitution is an ex gratia donation and not a 
matter of constitutional right [e.g. dignity].84 Throughout its jurisprudence the 
Court has been consistent about this premise.85 In the restitution cases the Court 
was of the view that when paying restitution the state does not settle claims in a 
legal sense, rather, it offers a grant. The government has a wide discretion in 
distributing such ex gratia donations. From a constitutional perspective this 
discretion is limited by the requirement of treating people as subjects with equal 
dignity. Partial restitution clearly satisfies this criterion, and so does periodical 
distribution of the amounts.86 The limits of legislative discretion were, however, 
revealed in a recent case where the Constitutional Court held that providing 
1 000 000 000 HUFs to one group of persons and 30 000 HUFs to the others 
violates the standard of treatment of equal dignity.87 
 The standard of review in non-discrimination cases becomes problematic, 
when the Constitutional Court does not specify clearly its reasons for interfering 
with legislative discretion. This is what happened in the following cases: 
although the justices hinted that the challenged rules violated an aspect of 
human dignity, the Court did not offer a more detailed reasoning thus leaving 
considerable room for doubt. In the incest case of 199988 the Constitutional 
Court found that the incest provision of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional 
to the extent it prohibited consensual homosexual sodomy between siblings. The 
challenged rule did not prohibit sodomy between heterosexual siblings. The 
decision of the Court in the incest case was based on the premise that the 
distinction drawn between homosexual and heterosexual siblings amounts to 
discrimination on “another ground’ under Art. 70/A of the Constitution. In the 
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1999 decision the Court found that the distinction in the Criminal Code was not 
based an objective and reasonable justification. 
 Thereafter, in the homosexual sodomy case89 the Constitutional Court was 
dealing with a challenge concerning provisions of the Criminal Code setting a 
different age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual. The Court found that 
the in the sodomy provisions the distinction based upon sexual orientation. 
Sexual orientation pertains to the core of human dignity, thus, any distinction 
between persons in this respect shall be justified by particularly serious reasons. 
Still, the Constitutional Court held that the applicable standard of review is not 
the one under the necessity—proportionality test, instead, the Court decided to 
follow its approach in the incest case and applied a “reasonableness” test. Thus, 
while the Constitutional Court did place sexual orientation in the context of 
human dignity, keeping the standard of review at the lowest level is a clear sign 
of hesitation as to the proper approach to be followed. Such an uncertainty was 
preserved despite the unique significance of the protection of human dignity 
once emphasized by the Constitutional Court.  
 The tripartite approach, providing different levels of constitutional protection 
to various aspects of human dignity is not without further problems. It was in the 
abortion cases90 where the Constitutional Court acknowledged the collision 
between the right to autonomy (self-determination) and the state’s interest to 
protect the life of the fetus. In the abortion cases the Constitutional Court 
refused to follow the language absolutes used in the capital punishment case, as 
such an approach would have resulted in a complete ban on non-therapeutic 
abortions. This solution was in part reached on the ground that the Constitu-
tional Court was not ready to declare that the fetus was a person under the 
Constitution with all rights protected therein. Instead, the Constitutional Court 
emphasized that this decision was for the constitution-maker or the legislator to 
take. In the case, the Court performed a balancing act between the woman’s self-
determination derived from her human dignity on the one hand, and the state’s 
duty to protect the life of the fetus on the other hand.  The state’s duty to protect 
unborn human life was derived from Art. 8(1) of the Constitution and is 
commonly associated with the state’s duty to provide for (institutional) 
guarantees necessary for the enjoyment of constitutional rights (institutional 
protection).  
 The limits of this balancing act applied successfully in the abortion cases 
without compromising the absolute of human dignity as recognized in the 
capital punishment decision were nonetheless highlighted in the Constitutional 
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Court’s recent decision concerning the constitutionality of physician assisted 
suicide.91 In the euthanasia case the Constitutional Court found that the decision 
to end one’s life with the active participation of a physician does not belong to 
the essential content (core) of the right to self-determination (autonomy). The 
limitation imposed by this prohibition must be in line with Art. 8(2) and shall be 
tested under a necessity-proportionality test. According to the longstanding 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the limitation of a fundamental right is 
acceptable if the protection of another fundamental right or liberty, or the 
protection of a constitutional value cannot be achieved by other means.92 In the 
case of euthanasia the limitations imposed on the right to self-determination 
(autonomy) derive from the obligation of the state to protect human life, as 
expressed in Art. 8(1) of the Constitution. It is the duty of the state to establish 
such procedures (safeguards) that protect the integrity of the terminally ill 
patient’s decision and eliminate the effects of potential interference by family 
members, friends and medial professionals on the patient’s decision. The 
appropriateness of the procedure established by law depends on the current state 
of human medicine, the overall quality of health care infrastructure and the 
availability of well-trained professionals to examine the patient’s decision and to 
carry it out. 
 Note that in the euthanasia case the Court departed from its jurisprudence 
and found that the unity of the right to life and human dignity does not apply in 
contexts where one’s life is taken by another person. In the context of euthanasia 
this approach is problematic. Although referring to the accomplice might seem 
as an obvious observation, it seems to avoid the core of the intellectual and 
constitutional problem presented by the relationship of the right to life, human 
dignity and self-determination (autonomy) in the euthanasia context. In the long-
standing jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the right to self-determination 
was derived from the unity of the right to life and human dignity, and not from 
human dignity alone. It was the inviolable unity of the right to life and human 
dignity that made it possible for the Court to declare capital punishment 
unconstitutional in its historic decision. After all, the very wording of Art. 54(1) 
of the Constitution securing protection for the right to life and dignity provides 
not only that these rights are inherent, but also that they might be subject to 
deprivations other than arbitrary ones. In the capital punishment case the 
Constitutional Court indicated an inherent tension in the language of Art. 54(1) 
of the Constitution, a tension which has not been resolved yet. This textual 
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uncertainty could be yet another reason for constitutional anxiety, when the 
Court is departing from its long established jurisprudence with such ease. 
 
3.3 Criminal law after the abolition of capital punishment 
 
In addition to calling for the amendment of the constitution, the Constitutional 
Court remarked in its decision that the abolition of capital punishment necessitates 
the reconsideration of the system of criminal sanctions.93 The Constitutional 
Court was not the first to raise the idea of recalibration. As that was already 
mentioned, the reform of the criminal justice system was under consideration 
since the Roundtable Talks and the democratically elected political forces also 
found it necessary. When talking about the potential abolition of capital 
punishment before the Constitutional Court’s decision, Minister Balsai also 
mentioned the need to reform the system of criminal sanctions as a logical 
consequence of removing death penalty. The large scale, strategic reform of 
criminal sanctions and sentencing along with adjustments called for by the 
Constitutional Court’s decision abolishing capital punishment did not 
commence until 1993.94 
 The Criminal Code provides that while observing the aim of criminal punish-
ment, sentences should correspond with the seriousness of the offence, the 
degree of culpability and other aggravating and mitigating factors [Art. 83, 
Criminal Code]. Depending on the personality of the offender and the motive of 
the crime committed, the judge may depart from the provisions prescribing the 
form of incarceration [Art. 45(2), Criminal Code]. Prior to 1993, as an exception, 
the judge was entitled to apply a sentence lower than the one prescribed in the 
Criminal Code, provided, that even the lowest sanction was too sever in the 
circumstances [Art. 87, Criminal Code]. In 1993 criminal judges were granted 
more discretion in sentencing: the rule for reducing sentences below the level 
prescribed by the Criminal Code was made a rule of general application.95 The 
amendment was expected to result in more individualized criminal sentences. 
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The legislature intended to rely on the internal mechanisms of the criminal 
justice system in readjusting the system of criminal sanctions.96  
 According to the chief prosecutor for the capital city, Hungarian criminal 
sentences are harsh compared to similar sentences in Western Europe, although 
in the meantime Hungarian crime rates are lower compared to Western 
democracies. He added that in Hungary, unlike in many Western states criminal 
sanctions other than incarceration are not regarded as punishment in the public 
eye. However, the government’s survey of the effects of the 1993 amendment 
made in 1997 suggested that criminal sentences were still very light.97 
 The government believed that elevating already existing terms of imprison-
ment in the Criminal Code was not going to result in heavier sentences. Instead, 
a set of amendments changed the rules applicable to sentencing, parole and 
probation, reducing sentences, accumulation and life imprisonment.98 Since 
the 1998 amendment life imprisonment means a minimum of 20 years in a 
maximum security prison.99  
 The first day of possible release shall be determined by the trial court. Further-
more, in its judgment the trial court may preclude the release of the convict 
sentenced to life imprisonment.100 In effect, this rule of sentencing introduced 
real life imprisonment in Hungary in 1998. However, note that life imprison-
ment never stands as a mandatory sentence under the Hungarian Criminal Code. 
 Note that the German Constitutional Court found real life imprisonment un-
constitutional in 1977.101 Relying on its dignity jurisprudence in the case, the 
German Constitutional Court attributed special significance to physical and 
psychological factors [‘hope’] in preserving the inmate’s dignity. In addition, it 
is important to note that the German Constitutional Court found it imperative 
that life imprisonment be backed up with a coordinated parole policy as opposed 
to an individualized, merit based parole system. While Hungarian constitutional 
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justices tend to listen to the wisdom of German constitutional jurisprudence, it 
remains to be seen whether such arguments would have similar weight before 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court once the constitutionality of the current rules 
on life imprisonment comes under review. The relevance of the ‘hope’ factor, 
however, was acknowledged.102 
 Although, the reasons for the government’s attempts to raise criminal 
sanctions are manifold, it would be a little far fetched to say that the government 
was acting under an obligation derived from the Constitutional Court’s 
statement in the capital punishment case. Indeed, the reform of sentencing rules 
might be better understood in the light of the revision of the criminal justice 
system as a whole. With transition to constitutional democracy and market 
economy there was clear need to reconsider guarantees in criminal procedure, 
to amend the rules applicable to young offenders and to introduce alternative 
sanctions economic crime. The opening up of the political system, however, 
brought unwelcome phenomena such as drug-related offences, the use of guns 
and explosives, money-laundering and the shocking brutality of a number of 
crimes against human life. The new trend of curbing judicial discretion and 
attempts to raise criminal sentences are attributable to a large extent to policy 
considerations aiming to fight organized crime.103 Indeed, in its general intro-
duction the official commentary of the legislative amendment distinguished the 
real life imprisonment from capital punishment. This comment might be read 
as a reassurance that the government has no intention to restore the death penalty. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper aimed to show how the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court abolishing capital punishment was formative of a context that prevents 
the restoration of the death penalty in Hungary. Amidst a web of influences 
supporting the abolition of capital punishment, such as the efforts of the Leagues 
Against Capital Punishment or the reinterpretation of the 1956 revolt, the 
Constitutional Court handed down its decision abolishing the death penalty in 
very abstract terms. The Constitutional Court was deciding the case not with-
in the narrow constraints of the moment. For instance, although the public 
discourse at the time of abolition was heavy with sentiments about the 1956 
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revolution, in its decision the Court did not mention the events of 1956 or the 
unjust and shameful executions in express terms. The concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Sólyom contains a subtle and elucidating reference in this regard. 
The abolition of capital punishment is more than the symbolic rejection of a 
system that sacrificed human lives for political purposes. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court abolished capital punishment because it is incompatible 
with the principles of constitutional government as perceived by the Court.104 
 The decision of the Constitutional Court paved the way for Hungary’s 
membership in the Council of Europe and made the ratification of Protocol No. 
6 exceptionally smooth, undertakings followed by the ratification of Optional 
Protocol No. 2 of the ICCPR. These international commitments altered the terms 
of the domestic discourse about capital punishment as they introduced new 
points of reference and new safeguards. The Constitutional Court’s decision was 
already a major step towards eliminating death talk from domestic public 
discourse. International obligations provide a further safeguard against the views 
of those who question the legitimacy or appropriateness of the Court’s decision. 
It only demonstrates the integrity of this context that one of the newer appointees 
to the Constitutional Court, Justice János Strausz is a retentionist. Also, due to 
Hungary’s international obligations there is no room for referenda on capital 
punishment anymore. In recent years there were two referendum initiatives sought 
the restoration of capital punishment. The National Elections Commission 
rejected the initiatives as pursuant to Art. 28/C(5) of the Constitution there 
should be no referendum concerning the fulfillment of international obligations. 
The Constitutional Court affirmed.105 The recent ratification of Protocol No.13 
to the European Convention on the unconditional abolition of capital punish-
ment was the last move to make in perfecting the abolitionist web. 
 An examination of the Hungarian capital punishment case in its broader 
context provides an excellent opportunity to observe the making of a discourse 
space and the development of a constitutional culture from its inception. When 
deciding about the constitutionality of capital punishment, the justices of the 
Constitutional Court intended to hand down an enduring decision. The judgment 
withstood trials at least in two distinct senses. On the one hand the decision 
became the foundation for building a system of safeguards against attempts 
seeking to restore capital punishment. These safeguards proved to be effective in 
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controlling the needs and aspirations of daily power games. The Constitutional 
Court’s decision became a reference point and a source of limitations for the 
purposes of the public discourse. On the other hand, an analysis of the juris-
prudence of the Constitutional Court reveals that the decision—itself a piece of 
creative judicial interpretation—was developed further by the Court and became 
a starting point for a number of jurisprudential concepts and means of right 
protection. In the light of these developments the exciting question of the day in 
the field of criminal is not whether there is room for restoring capital punish-
ment in Hungary, but whether “real” life imprisonment is constitutional.106 
 The success of abolition in Hungary is not to suggest that abolition of capital 
punishment via judicial review should be more successful per se than abolition 
via constitution-making, referendum or legislation.107 One may go as far as 
finding that unless a constitution clearly precludes capital punishment (such as 
Art. 102 of the German Basic Law), no judicial review forum can establish 
reasons, which are capable to prevent the restoration of capital punishment. 
Judicial review fora have the final say in the case before the bench, but they do 
not have a final say on the matter in its larger context. Following the decision of 
any constitutional tribunal, political branches may resort to amending the 
constitution or enacting new legislation, thus contributing to an ongoing 
discussion of public affairs. Therefore, the authoritative interpretation of the 
constitution by a constitutional review forum cannot prevent per se the political 
branches from reopening the discourse about capital punishment.108 Also, when 
newly established constitutional courts decide on the constitutionality of capital 
punishment among the first cases, the review forum may use this opportunity to 
lay the foundations of its jurisprudence, as was in Hungary or in South Africa. In 
comparison, old courts—the US Supreme Court being one of them—are 


 
106
 See an interview with the well-know defense attorney Orosz, B. in Fundamentum, 
1998. Vol. 2/4, 38. 
 
107
 Analysing the legitimacy of judicial review as a means to abolish the death penalty 
would exceed the limits and aspirations of the present paper. 
 
108
 For the concept of the political process as discourse see Habermas, J.: Between Facts 
and Norms, Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy [Faktizitaet und 
Geltung, Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates]. 
REHG, W. (trans.) Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1998, especially chapter 6 on the 
judiciary and the legislature and Stone, A. S.: Governing with Judges, Constitutional Politics 
in Europe. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 Cf. the words of Chief Justice Sólyom in his concurring opinion to the judgment 
abolishing capital punishment: “The legislative may sustain or abolish capital punishment at 
its liking—until the Constitutional Court delivers the final word on the constitutionality of 
the death penalty.” 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93. 
LESSONS FROM THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN HUNGARY 99 
  
constrained by the mass of previous case law.109 Thus, whether the decision on 
the abolition of capital punishment is taken by a constitutional tribunal or is 
the expression of political will, in order to fully understand its motivation, 
significance and implications, the decision shall be considered in its broader 
context. The timing of the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s decision abolishing 
capital punishment shall also be taken into account. At the time of the decision 
the Constitutional Court was a newly established institution untainted by the 
previous regime, a factor that rendered the Court immense popular (institutional) 
legitimacy. This phenomenon is not unique to Hungary. Another post-
authoritarian constitutional tribunal, the South African Constitutional Court, also 
benefited from similar legitimacy.110  
 If viewed so, the context built with the active participation of the Consti-
tutional Court is stabile while capable of accommodation and transformation. 
Indeed, the recipe offered by the Hungarian Constitutional Court turned out to 
be a highly successful one. Still, as the analysis suggests its success is due as 
much to careful planning as to the interplay of unforeseen but at least partly 
favorable factors. However, as these factors were in constant interaction with 
each other, the ratio of logic and luck might be impossible to determine. When 
describing phenomena in democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe 
‘rebuilding the ship on the open sea’ (Jon Elster) and ‘working at the drawing-
board’ (Stephen Holmes) are established metaphors. These metaphors suggest 
conscious planning, forward-looking intellectual exercises, the actors’ control 
over the project to a certain extent. Although the decision of the Court is regarded 
as an indispensable step in the evolution of the abolitionist context, careful 
analysis shows that while some components of the abolitionist context stem from 
strategic action or at least a forward-looking approach, unexpected and unfore-
seeable events also played a significant role. Since the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court’s decision, the emphasis has shifted from certain aspects of this context 
and put other issues in the limelight of attention. A term in the word-game of 
democratic transition, or rather, of transitology, which captures such interplay of 
intended and unexpected consequences is probably Timothy Garton Ash’s 
‘refolution’. An examination of the Hungarian case demonstrates the significance 
constitutional and legal safeguards in keeping the often rhapsodic sentiments 
about capital punishment at bay during and beyond ‘refolutionary’ times. 


 
109
 See Harcourt, B. E.: Mature Adjudication: Interpretive Choice in Recent Death 
Penalty Cases. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1996. Vol. 9, 255. 
 
110
 Webb: op. cit., 208.  
